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Abstract 
This paper presents results of the investigation of a phenomenon known as 
„earnings management” (EM) among the companies listed on the Polish stock 
market. The distribution of earnings per share (EPS) for the stocks around the 
threshold value of “zero” and the threshold of “recent performance” was 
analyzed in the period of years 1997-2010. Moreover, the changes of earnings 
for the stocks, which are suspected to manipulate their earnings, were also 
investigated. The results, which indicate asymmetric distribution of earnings 
around the zero threshold along with the relative deterioration of earnings in the 
year following the period when the companies were suspected to conduct 
earnings management practices, provide evidence that this phenomenon exists 
among Polish stock market companies. 
1. Introduction 
Earnings are one of the most important items of financial reports issued 
by public companies. Profits of every firm are closely scrutinized by 
shareholders, investors, financial analysts or boards of directors in order 
todetermine the attractiveness of a particular stock or to reward the executives 
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for their work and for their financial results. This is the reason why the 
management of a company sometimes decides to deliberately manipulate the 
firm’s earnings, so that the pre-determined targets can be achieved. Such 
strategy is often called “earnings management” (EM). Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
state that: “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes”. It must be emphasized, 
however, that earnings management, as we understand it for the purpose of this 
study, should not be confused with illegal activities, such as financial fraud, 
which is at the illegal end of continuum of activities of this type, whereas 
earnings management is at the legal end. 
Earnings management may be executed by two kinds of management 
actions: 
• accounting choices which follow legally accepted rules, 
• operating decisions.  
An example of an accounting choice is adopting the depreciable life for 
new plant at the high end of industry norms (in order to lower depreciation 
expenses) or at the level lower than the high end of industry norms.  
An example of operating decision is a delay in the execution of normal 
maintenance procedures in one period in order to reduce maintenance costs in 
that period and to perform this procedure in the following period. 
This kind of earnings management practices may lead to real economic 
costs, if the company incurs higher operating costs caused by the lack of 
maintenance in the future period. However, a company may pay real economic 
costs also via accounting choices. For example, it may pay a higher bonus in the 
subsequent period due to accounting earnings management (Ziv, 1998). 
One of the most frequently mentioned targets of earnings management is 
the, so called, smoothing. Smoothing has existed over decades and there are two 
general views as to what motivates managers to smooth earnings (Aflatooni and 
Nikbaht, 2010). According to the first view, smoothing is an efficient vehicle for 
managers to reveal private information (Ronen and Sadan, 1981, Demski, 1998, 
Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001, Srinidhi, Ronen and Maindiratta, 2001, 
Kirshenheiter and Melumad, 2002, and Goel and Thakor, 2003, among others). 
In such case, it may play a similar role as dividend smoothing (see, for example, 
Miller and Rock, 1985). The second view of smoothing is the, so called, 
garbling, according to which smoothing is an action undertaken by managers in 
attempt to fool financial analysts and the shareholders and to enhance 
managerial compensation (Beidleman, 1973, Lambert, 1984, Arya, Glover and 
Sunder, 1998, and Demski and Frimor, 1999, among others). 
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However, smoothing is not the only possible explanation for the motives 
behind earnings management. Since accounting numbers have no meaning 
unless they are compared to some benchmarks, companies have incentive to beat 
such benchmark as, for example, zero earnings, earnings in the corresponding 
periods in the past (for example quarter-to-quarter results) or analysts’ consensus 
forecasts (see Ronen and Yaari, 2008, Aflatooni and Nikbaht, 2010, among 
others). There exists evidence in the literature about earnings management 
aiming to exceed certain thresholds in form of a discontinuity in frequency of 
firms’ earnings around zero or some other threshold levels (Hayn, 1995, 
Burgstahler and Ditchev, 1997, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 2005). 
This paper deals with the latter effect, i.e. with earnings management 
thresholds. Most studies focused on that problem concern economies of 
developed countries, but the evidence from emerging markets is limited (see, for 
instance, Wójtowicz, 2010). The aim of our paper is to find out whether earnings 
management effects exist among Polish companies and whether they are similar 
in nature to this phenomenon in other, developed markets. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents methodology of this 
study, section 3 describes data sample, section 4 offers discussion of empirical 
results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology  
According to common opinions, executives care about some threshold 
levels when they report earnings. Two of them are the main subject of analysis 
in our study, i.e.: 
• the objective to report the profit above zero, 
• the objective to achieve at least the last period’s profit (i.e. not to worsen 
recent performance). 
Our study follows the methodology of Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 
(2005) based on the idea that execution of earnings management practices in 
order to reach or beat certain thresholds affects the distribution of net profits, 
when analyzed in a large group of companies, and can be explained on the basis 
of a 2-period model. In each period (t=1,2) the firm gets the random, 
independent and identically distributed draw of “true earnings” (T1 and T2). The 
“true earnings” can not be observed by outsiders who see only the reported 
earnings (R1 and R2). In period t=1 the executives can “manage” reported 
earnings by choosing an amount (M1) that is added to earnings such that:  
R1 = T1 + M1.                (1) 
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The cost of “earnings management” is paid later in period t=2, so that: 
R2 = T2 - K(M1)              (2) 
where K(M1) is the positive and increasing marginal costs of moving M1 away 
from 0 and K(0) = 0. 
In this analysis we adopt a simplifying assumption that the discount rate is 
equal to 0. The general meaning of equations (1) and (2) is that earnings 
management in period t=1 towards increasing the net profit by 1 PLN reduces 
net profit in period t=2 by more than 1 PLN (in our model M1 may be also 
negative; in such case the reduction in profit by 1 PLN in period t=1 would be 
followed by earnings increase in period t=2 by less than 1 PLN). 
We also assume that the company ceases to exist after period t=2 and 
every relevant information is revealed at this time.  
It is important to note that manipulation of earnings does not necessarily 
have to occur at any profit level. In fact, managers care only about particular 
values (which we call thresholds), because everyone concerned with the firm’s 
performance behaves the same way. In our study, we focus on two important 
thresholds, i.e.:  
• positive profit, 
• recent performance. 
Thresholds are important for several various reasons (Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser, 2003). Some of them are psychological in nature. First, a perception 
of positive and non-positive value in human mind is fundamentally different. As 
a result, there exists a solid division line between achieving and failing to 
achieve the value of earnings equal to zero. Second, earnings management 
across thresholds is relevant for the simplification of managers relation with 
shareholders and board of directors: the rewards for firms’ managers – both 
employment decisions and compensation benefits – often depend implicitly or 
explicitly on the earnings for which executives are responsible and which they 
generate (Healy, 1985). Moreover, banks may sometimes have the policies to 
grant loans only to firms that report positive earnings, which also increases the 
role and importance of positive earnings threshold. 
A certain pattern of earnings over time conveys key information to the 
markets about company’s financial situation and its stability. For example,  
a report showing that earnings have been increasing during the last 7 years is  
a cheap and simple way of communicating that the performance of the company 
is systematically good.  
Threshold effects may be meaningful even if only few participants react to 
them directly. For example, even if only banks care about thresholds, reaching 
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certain level of earnings will have a positive effect also for other market 
participants. 
Our analysis is divided into the following 3 stages:  
1. First, we investigate the distribution of earnings around selected thresholds, 
i.e. around the EPS = 0 (i.e. the positive profit threshold) and the EPS 
growth equal to zero (i.e. the positive earnings growth threshold), 
2. Second, we check whether there is a discontinuity in the EPS around the 
thresholds. We apply the test of discontinuity in a univariate distribution 
proposed by Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (2005) using the statistic τ. 
We examine the rank of τ  at the threshold relative to the other τ’s as well 
as its relative magnitude in order to assess whether discontinuity can be 
found at the analyzed threshold level. 
3. Third, we control whether according to equations (1) and (2) earnings 
management causes predictable changes in the earnings in the next period. 
This way we can find out whether the companies suspected to practice EM 
towards the increase of earnings, experience the decrease of their earnings 
in the following year. 
In the next sections we describe the database used in this study and 
present empirical results. 
3. Data sample 
The dataset used in this investigation consists of detailed information 
from income statements from 359 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE) in the period of years: 2000-2009. We selected two thresholds, 
i.e. positive profit and recent performance on the basis of annual and quarterly 
reports. 
The number of quarterly reports available was 7939 and the number of 
annual reports was 2726. 
The source of all data is “Notoria” database. 
4. Empirical results  
Our analysis aims to explore the extent to which executives can manage 
earnings to attain two threshold levels described above. We study the density 
function for earnings near those thresholds. If managers do indeed manage 
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earnings to reach certain level of them, we should expect to observe “too few” 
earnings reports directly below it and “too many” at or directly above it. We 
should also expect a discontinuity in density at the level of investigated 
thresholds. 
4.1. Positive profit threshold  
The first threshold which we consider is probably the most natural one, 
i.e. the positive earnings. The analysis of this particular threshold level addresses 
the most important question for shareholders, namely whether the company is 
profitable at all.  
Figure 1 presents the histogram of EPS for the threshold “positive/zero 
profits” for annual earnings. The distribution shows a considerable jump 
between the value of -0,30 and zero, which indicates that the managers strongly 
desire to be able to report positive earnings. The value of τ-statistic (based on 
the basic test for discontinuity) confirms this pattern. At EPS = 0 we obtain a τ 
value of 9,8, which is the highest in the sample and confirms discontinuity at 
that point.  
Figure 2 presents the same distribution but for quarterly EPS. The 
findings for this frequency of data are very similar to the results from annual 
data. In this case, the distribution also shows a considerable jump between the 
value of -0,07 and zero, so it appears that managers strongly desire to be able to 
report positive earnings. The value of a τ-statistic (based on the same test as 
before) at EPS = 0 is equal to 9,5. This, again, confirms a discontinuity at that 
point. 
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Figure 1. Histogram of annual EPS for the threshold “positive/zero profits” 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 2. Histogram of quarterly EPS for the threshold “positive/zero profits” 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Summarizing, our results presented in this section provide evidence that 
the zero value net profit may be treated as a threshold for earnings management 
among the Polish companies listed at the WSE.  
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4.2. Positive profit growth threshold 
We now turn to the analysis of the positive growth threshold. Figure  
3 presents results for annual EPS growth. The change in earnings, denoted as 
∆EPSA, is defined as annual EPS minus annual EPS from four quarters ago. In 
Figure 3 we can observe a jump in distribution at 0, however it is not as strong 
as in the case of the previously analyzed EPS threshold. It is worth mentioning, 
that in that case the jump is stronger at the level value of -0,24. This pattern of 
∆EPSA distribution is, therefore, not so strongly consistent with the view that 
executives manage earnings in order to achieve or beat the comparable figures 
relative to the results from four quarters ago (τ–test value is equal to 4,5). 
Figure 3. Histogram of change in annual EPS for the threshold of “positive growth” 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 4. Histogram of change in quarterly EPS for the threshold of “positive growth” 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 4 presents distribution of quarterly EPS growth. The change in 
earnings, denoted as ∆EPSQ, is defined as quarterly EPS minus quarterly EPS 
from four quarters ago. Figure 4 also exhibits a jump in the distribution at 0. 
However also in that case we can observe that a jump in distribution at 0 is not 
as high as in the case of the previously analyzed EPS threshold. This pattern of 
∆EPSQ distribution is, therefore, not so strongly consistent with the view that 
executives manage earnings in order to achieve or beat the quarterly earnings 
from a year ago. Nevertheless, the largest number of companies in the interval 
(0; 0,06); i.e directly above zero, may partly confirm that at least some managers 
treat the ∆EPS as a threshold. 
In summary, the results presented above may be considered as evidence 
that positive profit is the earnings management threshold for Polish companies, 
whereas the positive profit growth seems to be the threshold that is much less 
visible. Similar evidence for the Polish market presents Wójtowicz (2010). 
It is worthwhile to note that our results partly support the findings of 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (2005) for the US market, according to which 
both the positive profit and the positive profit growth thresholds drive the EM 
practices, however the thresholds are hierarchically ordered and the most 
important objective of executives seems to be to generate positive profits 
whereas the aim to achieve the results at least equal to those from four quarters 
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ago is of secondary importance. Our study, hence, provides evidence that the 
behavior of Polish and American managers is similar in that respect. 
4.3. The consequences of earnings management for future earnings 
According to the model analyzed in equations (1) and (2), earnings 
management aiming to achieve thresholds in one period will affect next period’s 
earnings. Thus, we now investigate whether following the period with likely 
EM, the earnings are changing according to any predicable pattern. 
As in Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhouser (2005) we examine the 
performance of the firms suspected to practice EM, i.e. those that just achieved 
the thresholds relative to the performance of firms which just missed the 
thresholds or easily surpassed them. We divide firms accordingly into five 
groups: A, B, C, D and E, depending on their earnings. Each group has a range 
defined as in Silverman (1986) and Scott (1992), which is related to the 
variability of the data and (negatively) related to the number of observations: 
k = 2·RK·n (-1/3)               (3) 
where RK is the sample interquartile range of the variable and n is the 
number of observations.  
Therefore, we distinguish the following groups: 
• Group A consisting of firms, which failed to meet the thresholds, i.e.: 
EPS < -k, 
• Group B consisting of firms, which just failed to meet the thresholds, i.e.: 
-k ≤ EPS < 0, 
• Group C consisting of firms, which just met or exceeded the thresholds, i.e.: 
0 ≤ EPS < k.  
• Group D consisting of firms, which beat the thresholds easily, i.e.: 
k ≤ EPS < 2k, 
• Group E consisting of firms which strongly surpassed the thresholds, i.e.: 
EPS ≥ 2k. 
Group C is likely to include a number of firms which by executing 
earnings management have increased their earnings in order to reach the 
thresholds. The number of such firms in Group D should be, presumably, lower.  
We denote the average performance of every group by a corresponding 
lower-case letter and indicate the period by a subscript 1 or 2. By assumption, 
the following relation should hold: 
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e1 > d1 > c1 > b1 >a1.             (4) 
Normally, we would expect some persistence in both the EPS level and in 
the change of earnings. Thus, in case EM does not exist, we would expect the 
following: d2 > c2 > b2. The question is how might earnings management affect 
these inequalities? Earnings recorded by companies in group C are suspected of 
upward manipulation. Hence, according to equation (2) c2 would move down 
relative to both d2 and b2, so: d2 - c2 > c2 - b2. If the earnings management is 
substantial, we might even possibly observe: b2 > c2, i.e. lower performance in 
period t=1 of those companies that just fell short of reaching the threshold 
would turn into better performance in period t=2.  
Table 1 presents the data regarding positive EPS level threshold and Table 
2 depicts the results for positive earnings growth threshold. 
Table 1. Next year’s relative performance by groups formed around the positive EPS 
threshold 
 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 
Mean: -9,35 -0,11 0,14 0,45 21,10 -5,52 -0,10 -0,08 0,38 8,36 
Median: -1,92 -0,10 0,14 0,45 2,13 -0,21 -0,03 0,12 0,43 1,69 
Number: 384 145 360 237 1230 384 145 360 237 1230 
 c1 - b1 = 0,25 < d1 - c1 = 0,31 c2 - b2 = 0,02 < d2 - c2 = 0,46 
Source: Own calculations. 
Table 2. Next year’s relative performance by groups formed around the positive earnings 
growth threshold 
 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 
Mean: -30,90 -0,11 0,11 0,35 11,39 2,57 0,16 -0,17 0,11 -7,11 
Median: -1,66 -0,09 0,10 0,34 1,80 0,18 0,00 0,00 0,08 -0,06 
Numbe: 706 237 254 134 657 706 237 254 134 657 
 c1 - b1 = 0,22 < d1 - c1 = 0,24 c2 - b2 = -0,33 < d2 - c2 = 0,28 
Source: Own calculations. 
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According to the results reported in Tables 1 and 2, group C with 
companies just reaching the thresholds significantly underperforms the group 
that missed the thresholds, which may be interpreted as the confirmation of the 
existence of earnings management practices within Polish companies. In both 
cases, i.e. the positive earnings and recent performance benchmarks, e2 > d2, as 
should be expected if heterogeneity in earnings outweights regression towards 
the mean effect. However, we are mostly interested in the relation between 
group C and its neighbours, i.e. groups B and D. In both cases d2 > c2, which is 
not surprising because firms from group D did better in period t=1. However, 
also in both cases: d2 - c2 > c2 - b2, which means that the relative performance of 
group C is worse than that of groups B and D. Moreover, in case of positive 
growth threshold: c2 < b2. Firms that just exceed the threshold “positive growth” 
appear to “borrow” earnings from the next year’s period, which confirms 
predictions of the model described by equations (1) and (2). 
5. Conclusions 
Net profit conveys crucial information for financial analysts, investors and 
different groups of shareholders, who are strongly interested in financial reports 
of earnings when they monitor executives’ performance. Managerial rewards are 
often linked to earnings, which in turn creates strong incentives for executives to 
manage profits of their companies. The analysis presented in this paper assesses 
the importance of thresholds from the point of view of EM and the consequences 
that these thresholds have for patterns of reported earnings. Our study shows 
how efforts to exceed thresholds induce particular pattern of EM among Polish 
companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The empirical findings 
presented in this paper provide clear support for the existence of EM practices 
driven by the desire to report positive profits and weaker support for the desire 
to sustain recent performance. We observe discontinuities in the earnings 
distributions, which indicates the existence of threshold-based EM effects.  
It seems, however, that the threshold of positive earnings is more important 
which provides evidence that the activity of Polish managers in the area of EM 
resembles the behavior of American executives. We also find evidence that the 
future performance of firms just reaching the thresholds appears worse than 
those companies that are suspected to a smaller degree to engage in the EM 
practices.  
Our findings may have important implications for financial analysts, 
investors and boards of directors in Poland. The relationship revealed in this 
study for the Polish market may help to predict direction of change in future 
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earnings and also to control whether the management of a company executes 
earnings management practices. Explorations of further connection between 
earnings and stock prices may be useful in creating investment strategies based 
on the findings from this study, which opens up new space for more research in 
this area. The results of our analysis confirm also that, similarly to developed 
markets, the phenomenon of earnings management exists among the companies 
listed on the stock market in Poland. 
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Streszczenie 
 
ZARZĄDZANIE ZYSKIEM W POLSKICH SPÓŁKACH GIEŁDOWYCH 
 
W artykule zaprezentowano rezultaty analizy zjawiska znanego jako „zarządzanie 
zyskami”, wśród spółek z polskiego rynku kapitałowego. Przeanalizowano rozkład zysku 
na akcję wokół progu „zero” oraz progu wyznaczonego w oparciu o wartości zysku na 
akcję z okresu przeszłego w okresie 1997-2010. Wyniki badania potwierdziły 
występowanie asymetrii rozkładu zysku na akcję wokół progu „zero” oraz spadek 
zysków w latach następujących po „zarządzaniu zyskiem” co wskazuje na występowanie 
analizowanego zjawiska na polskim rynku kapitałowym. 
